

## EVALUATING THE AGENCY OF UNITED NATIONS FORUM ON FORESTS IN HALTING DEFORESTATION

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### **Abstract**

*The recent decrease in deforestation suggests a success in global effort of halting it, yet the question on in the agency of United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) remains. Do these changes occur due to UNFF's facilitation? To examine this, this paper utilizes Principal-Agent theory proposed by Hawkins et al., (2006) to explore UNFF's autonomy and discretion and its role in halting deforestation. It will first analyse the historical and relational foundation of UNFF as an international organization (IOs) and then define the meaning of 'problem-solved' in terms of forest issue. It will then evaluate policy instruments and powers that UNFF holds using Martha & Finnemore's argument on the power of IOs. This paper argues that UNFF is serving as a forum for global forestry governance. It faces challenges due to differing national interests, limited discretion and significant role of NGOs in influencing discussions and advocating for sustainable forest management. Tensions persists between developed and developing nations in forestry issue, thus UNFF plays the role of collaboration and coordinating agents through Collaborative Partnership on Forest (CPF). It possesses limited role as arbitrating and enforcing agent due to Non-Legally Binding Instruments (NLBI) preferences of member states. However, UNFF possesses the power in terms of diffusing norms accepted by members, that halting deforestation is non-negotiable.*

**Keywords:** *International Organizations, UNFF, Global Forestry Governance, Principal-Agent Theory, Deforestation*

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Despite its abundant efforts, many parties have long cast doubts in international policy instruments dedicated to overcoming the rapid pace of environmental degradation. Halle incisively criticised Rio+20 as an incredibly expensive conference with minimum achievements in settling global environmental problems due to lack of commitment from member governments (Halle, 2019). Haas similarly expressed the same idea but also admit that it is this conferences that have positively contributed to the establishment of global environmental governance and lifting environmental issues as a matter of importance in international affairs (Haas, 2015).

In such circumstances, an interesting turn of events occurred in 2015 when United Nations' (UN) Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) released a report that revealed the decreasing rate of global deforestation. In its *Global Forest Resource Assessment (FRA)*, a

periodic report published every five years suggesting the most recent world's forest situation, FAO explained in a World Forestry Congress held in Durban that the deforestation rate during 2010-2015 has plummeted significantly. Despite the steady loss in global forest coverage, its rate has decreased from 0.18 percent in the 1990s that the current rate is as low as 0.08 percent. It is considered as a significant development since our world's forest comprises as a complete cure for almost all our current global environmental issues (FAO, n.d.-b).

This decreasing trend in deforestation brings back a second glimpse of hope in the widespread scepticism toward global environmental governance, after the success of Montreal Protocol in coordinating efforts to stop the rate of depleting ozone layer from our Earth's atmosphere (Rae, 2012). It suggests that the efforts in controlling deforestation have made positive progress. Nowadays, these achievements provide evidence that goals in environmental issues that was once seemed to be utopic now appear to become possible to attain. Even though it has not been entirely solved, this occurrence brings up a question, does the existence of current global forestry governance make any significant changes in solving deforestation problem? What is the role that UNFF has played as leading forestry regime in facilitating global effort to tackle this issue?

This piece of work is dedicated to answering the abovementioned question. To answer that question, this paper will focus especially on United Nations Forum on Forest as a UN body specifically designed to combat deforestation. This doesn't mean that other organization are not producing significant impact on forestry, but it is simply to look at the organization where forestry issue is most relevant to discuss and involving most countries in the world. In doing so, this paper will first attempt find out the formation of forestry issue within the context of rising environmental concern and then analyze the dynamic of relationship between states and international organizations using principal-agent theory and the role of non-governmental organizations (NGO) (Hawkins et al., 2006). Secondly, it will define the meaning of 'problem-solved' in terms of deforestation issue and then identify and describe UNFF's policy instruments taken as measures in achieving goals. In doing so, this article will use Barnett-Finnemore's idea regarding the power of international organizations (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). Third, these policy instruments taken in decreasing deforestation will be analyzed whether it is suitable with political and social constraints among actors in global forestry governance. This paper argues that, however slowly, the progress made in global forestry regime has been apparent and it is vividly going toward solving forestry problem.

## B. METHOD AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To delve within the subject of role and power of IOs in international relations, this paper conduct research using secondary materials from books, commentaries, journal articles, reports and many other documents on the subject of international regimes on forestry issue. The main actor being analysed is the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF), including its historical background, predecessors and units/division within the organization. This research conduct qualitative study on the subject matter using two papers as the primary sources of theoretical framework, namely: (1) “Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Theory” by Hawkins et al., (2006) as the main source on the argument about delegation to IOs and (2) “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations” by Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, (1999) to dig deeper the power that UNFF possesses on global forestry governance. Using the below-explained understanding of role and power of IOs become the basis for our analysis in this volume. By using the above framework, it explores how UNFF establishes its legitimacy in global forestry governance and subsequently exercise its power.

The first framework that we utilize in this paper is Principal – Agent Theory on IOs. It argues that states delegate tasks to an IO by providing a certain degree of *autonomy* and *discretion* during the establishment through *contracts*. States are thus considered as the *principal* that provides IOs with authority (thus states must posses it beforehand) to manage a certain issue for them. Meanwhile, IOs are considered as the *agent* acting on behalf of state’s affairs, creating policies and actions, despite also having the ability to constrain state’s behavior as a consequence. To allow IOs as agent to substantially make changes, states provide it with *autonomy*, understood as the extent of possible maneuvers available to IOs following *mechanism of control* as the condition of this authority to deliver tasks being assigned to it. IOs also enjoys discretion, a statement that declares agent’s mission to achieve principals’ goals without specifying actions. The larger discretion, the larger the responsibility of agents’, yet autonomy (or range of actions) could still be limited due to state’s unwillingness to loosen control. Both mechanism of control and autonomy is designed to prevent *agency slack* (undesired action by agents) and *agency losses* (when the agent has deviated from its initial function) (D. Hawkins et al., 2006).

The degree to which a country delegates its tasks to IO can be further classified into three nodes as illustrated in picture 1. The first node is *unilateralism*, which represents state's independent action without involving IO as agent in implementing state's policy. In the second node, states are engaged in *international cooperation* by delegating its tasks to cooperate and coordinate with other states through a forum. In such forums, agreements are obtained and government implement these through ratifications and independent state-controlled actions. IOs, at this level, are forums for coordination, without any autonomy to implement policies. The highest autonomy and discretion are provided in the third node, which is *delegation to IOs*. Common policy are agreed and then IOs are assigned to implement the policy within the member states, including interfering with its affairs (Hawkins et al., 2006).

According to Hawkins et al (2006), IOs functions as a number of different roles that attracts states to delegate its tasks to IOs due to benefits that these IOs offer in each of its functions. There are actually a number of functions that IOs play: **First**, IOs are *specialized agents* equipped with expertise, resources, time, and political skills, that specifically increased the incentives for states to delegate especially those requires assistance in delivering the task. **Second**, IOs act as *coordinating and collaboration agents* due to diverging preferences over policies of states that hinders problem-solving efforts and reduce efficiency of coordination when conducted unilaterally. IOs may even produce solutions to dilemmas in coordination, and further promote collaboration. **Third**, IOs will promote a more nuanced balance in issues being discuss in the forums, therefore becoming *agenda-setting agents* by provoking considering different problems from different actors to discuss especially when there are imbalances in the distribution of power among member states. This way, IOs are managing preferences of states to approach ideal point of collective institutional preference, so that collective decision-making problems can be avoided (Hawkins et al., 2006).

In times of dispute, the **Fourth** role that IOs may play is becoming *arbitrating agents*. This is when dispute arises that resolution requires third party mediation or intervention. **Fifth**, when necessary, IOs organized itself as a neutral *enforcing agent* to ensure compliance of member states to agreed common policy. It includes IOs authority to incur costs upon violations to direct issues to desired goals. And **finally**, IOs play the role of *policy-biased agent*, which means that it prevents resentment among member states by creating perception that decisions have optimally considered preferences, thus obscuring the views that structural, winner-loser dichotomy persists in the organization (Hawkins et al., 2006).

When an IO has obtained considerable authority due to higher degree of discretion and autonomy, it enjoys power that enables it to run its organization and achieve goals. Martha & Finnemore (1999) argues that IOs power include a range of functions namely: (1) classification, (2) the fixing of meanings and (3) diffusion of norms. **First**, IOs design classification to manage information and knowlegde crucial for its running. Such endeavor is an exercise of power as IOs held privilege to make definition and apply categories. **Second**, the ability to control knowlegde and information means that IOs carry the power in determining acceptability of certain actions or even actors. It enables IOs to delineate boundaries of acceptable actoons and its parameters, thus this power entails the ability for legitimacy and justification. **Third**, the claim on IOs expertise becomes the source of legitimacy for IO and thus allowing it to disseminate norms and what constitutes best practices according to this norm. IOs play the role as protagonist, and thus its value and norms should be promoted, it claims.

## C. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### 1. Global Forestry Governance

Forestry problem occupies the very contraction between environmental and development issue. Increasing economic activity requiring materials from forests is largely the cause of the accelerating rate of deforestation, a term defined by FAO as any human activity that changes land usage from forest-covered areas into other purposes (FAO, n.d.-a). Loss of forest coverage has been the leading cause of flooding, soil erosion and account for large amount of carbon dioxide emission that contributes to global warming (Kafy et al., 2023). On the other hand, protection of forest is considered as one of the major key to preserve our world from the risk of global warming and climate change.

#### *Dynamic of Global Forestry Issue and the Establishment of UNFF*

In the early emergence of forestry problem, international process regarding forestry issue is commenced by FAO and International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO). FAO is the leading organization initiating international discussion on forestry issue since 1940s, that eventually led to an establishment of Committee on Forestry in 1971. A decade later, an organization with similar economic-driven motivation brought countries to agree upon International Tropical Timber Agreement 1983 that become the legal foundation of ITTO (Chasek et al., 2010). These policy instruments discussed about forest mostly as an economic resource rather than environmental treasure.

Subsequently, Earth Summit was held 1992, widely considered as pivotal moment in terms of solving environmental problem including forestry. Although this conference that was held in Rio de Janeiro is widely considered as a U-turn from economic interest to environmental concern, development gap, issues over sovereignty and interference, and lack of political will, hindered any development to establish a treaty on forestry. This conference resulted in the first product recognizing the importance of forestry issue, two forest document adopted in Rio conference, namely Forestry Principle and Chapter 11 of Agenda 21, despite being weak non-legally binding legal framework as a result of clashing perspective in viewing forest (Chasek et al., 2010). Nevertheless, these documents are important stepping stone in continuing negotiation in the future.

These documents are evidences that negotiation process on forestry has since reflected deep tension between developed North and developing South (Wang, 2001). During UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), developing countries like Malaysia and India insisted that forest should fall under national control while Canada and United States considered it as global commons. In this phase, developing states viewed the North as opportunistic states trying to interfere their sovereignty (Chasek et al., 2010). In 1995, UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) established Intergovernmental Panel on Forestry (IPF) to bridge differences between both parties. During this panel discussion, both parties crisscrossed their position, with European Union, US, Japan, New Zealand and Australia which initially supporting a treaty, now against that idea. On the other side, countries like Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Costa Rica, and the Philippines then support the idea of a treaty. The only countries that are consistent in holding their position are South Americans, led by Brazil.

This dynamic dominates negotiation on forestry issue through the later years. IPF ended up with limited impact despite its abundant proposals and recommendations. Similarly, Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) has the same pattern, continuing negotiation process started by IPF. These forums eventually brought countries to agree on the establishment of United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) in 2000. Consecutively, it is these three organizations that has played major role in the discussion and thus a major meeting place for state's interest in terms of global forestry governance.

### *State-IGOs Relations in Tackling Deforestation*

UNFF was established at the time when countries realized the necessity of a permanent forum for countries to deal with forestry issue. The negotiation process to agree on a treaty has been conducted for 8 years continuously, which demonstrates countries' acknowledgment of the importance of this issue for every member states involved. IPF/IFF are merely set up for temporary mandates (for 2 years each), recognizing willingness of both developed North and developing South to jointly collaborate toward further process. For this reason, it is founded in form of a forum where countries are not tied to any agreement whatsoever except customary law agreed within UN environment. A forum provides gathering place for countries to discuss without being legally obliged to comply with any regulation. Given the contentious nature of discussion in the previous sessions, this form is currently the best possible choice to bring in countries' commitment to solve forestry problem.

Albeit consensus over a treaty has never been acceded among these countries, most member states share similar political and economic interests (Chasek et al., 2010). Canada has been and still is the leader among those countries that agree to build convention to settle the problem while Brazil is leading countries to opposed that idea. Most other countries are jumping from opposing or acceding, depends on each country's assessment on the situation. Developed North are divided between the notion of environmental protection and concern over accountability of financial aid provided for developing countries. On the other side, Developing South are also split among those who would prioritize its sovereignty over forest resource and the ones that would be willing to protect their forest if there are financial aid and transfer of knowledge.

Due to this confronting position, it's not surprising that UNFF can only enjoy little discretion in its assignments. Hawkins et al (2006) explains that in delegating task to international organizations (IO), a state would provide a certain level of discretion, understood as range of contract between assignor (state) and assignee (IOs). IPF has a mandate to promote discussion among governments to reach consensus, monitor the implementation of Forest Principle and Chapter 11 Agenda 21, and suggest future development. Meanwhile, IFF is established to implement and monitor the implementation of proposals reached in IPF, which include transfer technology, financial aid, research and assessment on forest, and then to prepare a body engaging international actors in terms of settling forestry issue. Subsequently, UNFF is established as a subsidiary body under UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) following IPF and IFF. It has mandate to implement proposals from IPF/IFF, become meeting place for dialogue regarding forestry issue, enhance cooperation and coordination of policy,

promote North-South collaboration and private-public engagement, monitor and assess the implementation at all levels, and encourage political commitment to tackle forestry problems (UN ECOSOC, 2000). These mandates suggest that UNFF is founded as a medium for countries to discuss forestry issue and trying to reach consensus. It is a battleground for states with each own interest, rather than an organization with its own authority.

In terms of reason for delegation, UNFF is provided with mandate as coordinating agent, collaborating agent, enforcing agent, and policy-biased agent (D. Hawkins et al., 2006). It's not a specialized agent since UNFF draws experts from external source by arranging programs like Ad-Hoc Expert Groups (AHEG), and Collaborative Partnership on Forest which incorporates major research institutions on Forestry like Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) (Recent and Upcoming Ad-Hoc Expert Groups, n.d.). Collaboration and coordinating agent suit the task given to UNFF, since it is basically the reason why this forum is founded. UNFF, since its establishment, has held 11 forums as the place where interests are expressed and then negotiated to create a win-win solution for all countries, exemplifying coordinating agent, where UNFF plays as a neutral impartial third party that facilitate this process. In its role as collaborating agent, UNFF's task is quite limited to only facilitate dialogue and thus unable to perform public good effectively. This is also evident in the mandate that UNFF will have the power to bring parties into the table but not enforcing what has been agreed on the table. Countries already committed to deal with forestry issue delegate this task to discuss it within UNFF, thus the idea of enforcing agent is applied, however with high discretion but the decision to make it a non-legally binding instrument (NLBI) demonstrates UNFF's tiny autonomy. Both decision to agree upon NLBI and UNFF's little autonomy also suggest that UNFF is not arbitrating agent, thus unable to solve dispute between members. Meanwhile, high discretion is granted to accommodate states' highly varied preferences. On the other hand, UNFF is within UN system, thus reducing possibilities for future national regime to revoke from the agreement made with UNFF. UNFF has also been used as an agent to create policy bias, which is evident in a way that countries assessed the situation differently that enabled these countries to change position toward the agreement, like what most countries did in IPF. While UNFF's high discretion with little autonomy means clear mandates for these organizations, this would also mean that they have very small authority and power to exercise, thus limiting their possibility to reach success in settling clashing interest among countries discussing forestry issue.



### *The Role of NGO in Forestry Issue*

NGOs concerning forestry issues have been founded since 1980s and varied widely in terms of its scope of work and size of fund. These NGOs usually emerged as reaction to government's lack of capacity to manage forest. There are local NGOs playing in limited community, or usually called as community groups. Organizations like Proshika in Bangladesh and FKMM in Indonesia are examples of local/community-scale NGOs. In terms of direct forest management, engagement with indigenous forest people and forest protection, and issues largely excluded from government's concern, local NGOs play large role in these areas (Tomi, n.d.).

Meanwhile, other NGOs will become an advocate of forest-friendly policies especially under forest-related and environment-related ministries in national level. Forester Act in Indonesia and Finnish Forest Research Institute mainly work in this level. International forestry NGOs also have similar goal, but it's actions are more directed toward international coordination and consider significant actions to improve global forestry situation. This category includes Global Forest Coalition (GFC), World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Forest, Green Peace International, International Network for Bamboo and Rattan, Rain Forest Alliance, Tropical Forest Group, World Forest Institute, and many more.

Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) are by far the fiercest party in the struggle to protect world's forest. NGOs have been actively involved in the discussion regarding forestry particularly since Rio Summit, when huge number of NGOs were participating in the making of Forest Principle and Chapter 11 Agenda 21 (Chasek et al., 2010). During this conference, NGOs proposed the idea of forest as local commons, so that it is the people in surrounding areas, especially indigenous people, who have the rights as well as obligations to manage forest. In this conference, NGOs influence actors with more authority and power during negotiations from Rio Summit until UNFF. Even though widely seen as having low-level of influence to exercise, NGOs are important in generating ideas and information about forest situation and what needs to be done to solve the problem, as well as providing ideas for initiatives in regards to this effort. Similar to IGOs, it is this power to diffuse new norms that has become one of the most determining feature of NGOs in international politics (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999).

Furthermore, NGOs are considered as representation of civil society at large within dialogue, thus, inviting NGOs oftentimes means engaging civil society (Asadi, 2008). This is also an important position that has power in it, a power to push government action, claiming that NGOs are representation of world's population, accommodating people's voice from

grass-root level. This power is visible during IPF meeting when NGOs suspected countries regarding which interest and values these countries support in the dialogue. Other case would be the time when NGOs complained about lengthy policy negotiation within UNFF and push governments to establish targets in reaching global forestry management immediately (Chasek et al., 2010).

## **2. Halting Deforestation**

To decide whether current global forestry problems can be solved, it is crucial to determine the goals are achievable or not. To do so, this paper will define what is the meaning of ‘problem-solved’ in global forestry governance and policy instruments taken to solve these problems. Before discussing the meaning of ‘problem-solved’ in terms of deforestation problem, it is important to understand that almost all global goals on solving problems are gradual targets that leads to better future. This does not mean that the problem is unsolvable, it would mean that global problems are just as sustainable as the required effort to tackle it. Therefore, these targets are made to ensure that the closer we are to the future, the more we take continuous steps to handle it. In terms of deforestation problem, the most fundamental target would be Zero Deforestation and Forest Degradation.

### *Zero Net Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ZNDD)*

ZNDD, which is considered as the most pivotal targets in solving global forestry problems, is achieved in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2008. It is important to note that this standard is set by UNFCCC instead of UNFF, involving state parties, companies and NGOs. Zero net deforestation means that in using forest resource, sustainability must be maintained by configuring land-use cycle of forest, protecting biodiversity and enhancing carbon quality and quantity. It means that primary forest should be maintained as part of protection, while some other can be used as forest plantation. In counting zero net deforestation, losses in terms of deforestation and gains from reforestation or forest plantations are added to find difference (both increasing or decreasing in coverage) of forest cover in a certain area in limited number of time. This concept is different from gross deforestation, which means total number of forest coverage loss, change of land use from forestry into non-forest lands in a determined period (Brown & Zarin, 2013).

This goal, which is set to be reached by 2020, is attempted through an initiative called Reducing Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). REDD initiatives is regarded as the

strongest instrument in enforcing forestry governance. It provides a mechanism within which developing countries are rewarded with incentives for protecting its forest by demonstrating several indicators. However, problems emerged in the implementation regarding reference level (a threshold to determine how much incentives should a country receive for protecting forest, which is hard to define since every country has different characteristic in its forests), implementation scale (national or project-based), financial issues (fund-based or market approach), steps in implementation and engagement of subnational actors (Irawan, S. & Tacconi, L., 2009).

#### *Non-Legally Binding Instrument (NLBI)*

Since a treaty doesn't seem to serve many countries' interest, NLBI has always been the most preferable outcome. The first regulation on forest agreed at Rio Summit, known as Forest Principles, is a result of fierce negotiation within UNCED between developed and developing countries. In these negotiations, Canada has always been the leading country attempting to form a convention on forest, which considers NLBI as a step toward LBI in the future (Buxton, 1992). However, IPF/IFF acted as an extension of this negotiation, where proposals are made NLBI even though the language of its proposals clearly demonstrate that it's aiming for LBI. Similar NLBI is adopted in UNFF-6 and UNFF-7 where the instrument regulates code of conduct for sustainable forest management.

It is widely believed that there are 2 conditions for implementation of LBI in global forestry governance. First, an establishment of LBI is possible whenever developed states are willing to provide development aid in assisting other countries to protect its forests. Second, United States and Brazil as the leader of opposing groups against LBI are also willing to agree to such agreement (Schneider, Thomas W., 2006). Such possibility is also conditional on the terms of agreement.

#### *International Arrangement on Forest (IAF) and Collaborative Partnership on Forest (CPF)*

IAF and UNFF are embodiments of world's and UN's deep concern toward forestry issue that has been long negotiated but has not yet reached any binding legal instrument. IAF is a framework under UN ECOSOC while UNFF is the forum to engage countries and stakeholders in negotiation. Its goal is to encourage sustainable forest management, development and conservation, and tied every party to commit to bettering forestry policy (UNFF, n.d.).

CPF is one of UNFF's work to solve forestry issue by extending Inter-agency Task Force on Forest (ITFF) through collaborating agent within which the most prominent international organizations can connect. This partnership chaired by FAO embraced international organizations both intergovernmental and non-governmental within a framework of coordination to align work in improving global forestry situation. Its goal is to promote and collect political commitment for sustainable forest management. Its members are varied from research institute (CIFOR, IUFRO, ICRAF), IGOs (UNDP, UNEP, UNFCCC, UNCCD, UNFF, FAO, IUCN, World Bank) and treaty organizations (ITTO, CBD, GEF). Their work includes coordinating policy instruments in tackling forestry issue, like certification, financial assistance, technical assistance, aligning terms used in regulations and its practice, and collecting and synchronizing information from different sources regarding forestry (About the Collaborative Partnership on Forests, n.d.).

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

In implementing forestry agreement, funding is the most sensitive and problematic issue that countries must deal with. Financial issues remain the most intriguing problem in global forestry governance since it is proposed in UNFF-1 that developed countries would allocate 0.7 % of their annual GDP to finance development assistance for developing countries in regards to forest protection. Many argues that this mechanism is too risky given the lack of accountability in developing countries, while most developed countries maintained that every state should allocate its own GDP for forest protection.

UNFF certainly plays the role as a meeting place for stakeholders concerning forestry issue, whether it is NGOs, INGOs, states and companies. Political constraints between countries in the discussion of forestry regime is evident throughout the years, that makes it difficult to reach a consensus to agree on a treaty. UNFF indeed becomes a battleground of clashing interests between countries. Blocs in the negotiation of forestry issues is vividly visible, with Canada as promotor of treaty supported mostly by developing countries while on the other side Brazil and USA as the leading oppositions are supported by developed countries capable of providing financial and development assistance.

Even though UNFF has no power to bound countries with binding agreement, this forum is sufficient to bound countries in a negotiation process. It is important for these countries to

keep having dialogue, since dialogue is the least step toward agreement. Furthermore, during process of negotiation, countries position might change overtime, as evident in the case of developing countries eventually agreed on decision to form an LBI in 1995. This fact demonstrates that UNFF has become a facilitator in accommodating state's interest.

Indeed, bridging differences among NGOs and INGOs is crucial as these organizations may have different focus area. These organizations, despite working on the same issue, may have different opinion and definition on key terms used in the discussion, depends on the focus of the organizations, for example FAO in agriculture and food, CBD in biodiversity, UNEP in general concern about environment, etc. This service in harmonizing terms and definitions provided by CPF through its meetings and initiatives is central to reach global consensus on forestry.

Aside from this service, UNFF has also provide a place for coordinating and collecting resources necessary to build a strong global forestry governance. The first important resource as global governance through international organizations, the ability to exercise power and the authority itself. However indirectly, these power and authority gained from states granting it to UNFF through UN remain legitimate. States also provide IOs with financial resource since it is countries that become financial support of IOs.

On the other hand, the strongest push to maintain well-managed forest comes from NGOs, which UNFF obtained from forming CPF. These NGOs also act as monitoring parties in the implementation of proposals and agreements made by countries. This role is evident when NGOs suspected countries of not profoundly struggle for forest management but simply act for own economic and political interest through countries action in changing support/opposition toward forest convention. With both strong will to make progress in forest protection from NGOs and states as authority-granting and financing principal, current global forestry regime with UNFF as a leader seems promising.

Amidst this optimistic view, the abundant availability of IGOs concerning forest issues worldwide cast doubts on UNFF's ability to enforce the agreed regulation effectively. There seems to be an overlapping work among these organizations, which may result in excessive unnecessary and uncoordinated action. However, it should be noted that these organizations have different concern and focus. It means that these organizations are even more specialized and focus on specific area of expertise, which would be beneficial for global forestry governance. IAF is a general setting created by ECOSOC which would maintain the system of global forestry governance within UN, while UNFF is the umbrella forum for international

negotiation about forest governance, and CPF is a collaborating and coordinating framework in working together with civil society and NGOs in harmonizing actions.

To put it all together, although financial issues did get in the way of achieving global consensus on forest issue, UNFF's role as a bridge that connects all parties that has concern about forest issue is pivotal. Despite its lack of authority, UNFF becomes a gentle forum that promote dialogue, leaving parties to decide the future destiny of our forest. However, while borrowing hand from other parties like UNFCCC through CPF, UNFF successfully push forest-rich countries to start implementing NLBI in its region. Furthermore, UNFF becomes the coordinating table where NGOs align with one another to unite in the struggle for world forest. Thus, this paper concludes that the future of our forest would likely be brighter in the future, as the FAO report suggested.

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